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Don't Forget the Coup Plots!

2/16/2022

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Salah Ben Hammou

While fully-realized coup attempts (successful and failed) have dominated the headlines within the last year, thwarted coup conspiracies in locales such as Jordan, Madagascar, Kyrgyzstan, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have notably received less attention from observers. Discussions of the recent “coup epidemic” generally exclude mentions of thwarted plots and related arrests. Coup researchers also tend to overlook these events, often referring to Henry’s Kebschull’s claim that plots can be “deliberately contrived nonsense put forth to serve the regime’s interest.”

Across the board, coup plots are generally treated as afterthoughts.

 However, far from negligible events, thwarted conspiracies can often signal important developments in a given country and should receive more attention by observers and researchers alike. 

WHY CARE ABOUT COUP CONSPIRACIES?
To be clear, it is natural that observers express more interest in concrete actions to overthrow the government rather than thwarted conspiracies. After all, actual coup attempts often see tanks deployed into the capital city, soldiers capturing radio and television stations, and in some cases, high levels of violence.  In other words, coup attempts can generally be hard to miss. Beyond their spectacle, these events also lack many of the uncertainties associated with alleged plots. Harkening back to Kebschull, governments can indeed use false allegations of a coup conspiracy to advance some purpose. Details surrounding thwarted coup plots are also often ambiguous. 

There are two issues with neglecting coup plots on this basis. 

First, discarding all thwarted plots on the basis of fabrication and ambiguity overlooks the importance of actual conspiracies, which can often signal discontent with the standing regime. In some cases, uncovered plots can serve as a precursor to an actual attempt. Second, fabrications do not occur in a vacuum and can reflect ongoing power struggles within the government or an incumbent’s attempts to consolidate their authority. Put otherwise, fabricated coup allegations are not randomly assigned and represent a “...commonly-used tool for consolidating power” by targeting political rivals. 

USING COUP PLOTS AS SIGNPOSTS
Recent examples highlight both of these considerations. For instance, the developments in Burkina Faso perhaps best illustrate that an uncovered conspiracy can serve as an early signal of the armed forces’ discontent with the government. On January 8, 2022, Burkinabe authorities arrested eight soldiers on allegations of plotting to oust President Roch Kaboré. Details on the coup plotters’ motives and demands were scarce but observers speculated that the plotters were disgruntled over the government’s response to Jihadist violence, a grievance shared by thousands of protestors back in November 2021. It would not be long before other forms of military discontent occurred. Two short weeks later, Burkinabe soldiers rallied together for a mutiny demanding a change to the government’s policy towards the insurgencies. On January 24, soldiers successfully removed Kaboré in a coup and installed a military junta led by Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba. Similarly, October 2021 saw authorities alleged to have uncovered a coup conspiracy by junior officers in Guinea-Bissau. Five months later, soldiers attempted to unseat President Umaro Embaló but ultimately failed to do so. Rather than assuming that these coup plot allegations were simply contrived nonsense, observers could have seen these events as telltale signs of serious discontent against the government. 

Coup plots - fabricated or otherwise - can also signal the consolidation of power by a variety of actors and can reflect the culmination of a longstanding power struggle. Saddam Hussein’s famous 1979 purge was predicated on allegations that he had uncovered a coup plot by senior Baathist officials and used this event to brutally eradicate several opponents in the regime. Later, the allegations were revealed to be false. More recently, in the DRC, the arrest of Francois Baya - often considered the country’s “intelligence strongman” - comes in the midst of President Felix Tshisekedi’s efforts to sweep away holdovers from the former Kabila regime as argued by Jonathan Powell earlier this week. This week’s coup-related arrests in Djibouti might also reflect an attempt to shore up Guelleh’s regime in the midst of coup attempts across the continent. 

However, incumbents are not the only ones who can use coup plots for such purposes. In particular, the intelligence services can often emerge as a clear benefactor following a thwarted conspiracy. For example, Jordan’s highly ambiguous 2021 coup plot, which implicated Prince Hamza,  may have represented a broader power struggle within the Hashemite regime amid an ongoing COVID-19 crisis as argued by Rosalie Rubio and myself last year. However, we also note that the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) could have fabricated the plot to cement their valuable position in the government. In 1991, a fabricated coup plot (the Barraket Essahel affair) implicated several members of the Tunisian armed forces in the early years of President Zine Abidine Ben Ali's regime. Some have alleged the Interior Ministry concocted the plot albeit based on shaky evidence at best. In any case, the plot served a purpose to continue to curtail opposition towards the regime. 

TAKEAWAYS: INTEGRATING COUP PLOTS
Thwarted conspiracies can be highly useful for researchers and forecasters interested in a variety of different questions concerning political instability. Despite their scarcity, efforts using coup plots and related arrests have illustrated the utility of these events. For instance, studies by Mehmet Bardakçi (2013) and  Gürsoy (2012) have illustrated the process in which Recep Tayyip Erdogan has consolidated power in his regime. Bell (2016) uses coup-related arrests to distinguish between the strategies of democracies and autocracies in responding to coup threats. Writing for the Monkey Cage, Bell and Powell (2016) reveal that recent coups can spark coup-related arrests among geographic neighbors. The finding is particularly relevant given the recent coup cascade seen in 2021 and now in 2022. 

Overall, collecting data on thwarted coup conspiracies poses a host of different challenges. Current efforts to collect coup plot data by the Center of Systemic Peace and the Cline Center emphasize the questionable nature of these events. However, as questionable as they may be, coup conspiracies play an important role in the story of coups, authoritarianism, and political instability.


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Coup allegations in Djibouti

2/16/2022

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Claiming a coup conspiracy, President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti has ordered the arrest of prominent officials. The accused, including Major General Zakariya Sheikh Ibrahim, Colonel Abdullahi Abdi Farah, a former cabinet member, and officials who had recently returned from abroad, are reportedly under house arrest. The current situation was reportedly sparked by an intercepted phone call that might also compromise the first lady. 

General Zakariya has been Djibouti's Chief of Defense Staff since the retirement of Major General Fathi Ahmed Houssein in late 2013. Colonel Abdi has served as the director of the National Police for over a decade. If the accusations are true, the two would have been very well-placed to coordinate on a conspiracy against their president.
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Djibouti topped CoupCast's list in April 2021 amid Guelleh's re-election for a fifth term.
The most remarkable aspect of Djibouti's coup history is that in a region rife with coups, it is one of the few countries that has not seen a leader succumb to one.​ Perhaps the closest was December 2000, when Guellah--still in his first term--was faced with a rebellion from the national police. Following the removal of the force's head, General Yacin Yabeh Galab, supporters of the latter revolted against the regime. Amidst a 45-minute firefight with the Army, the National Police temporarily controlled the television and radio waves but we unable to rally support for their cause. Though Yabeh managed to escaped to a French military installation, he was soon handed over to Djiboutian authorities. General Yabeh passed away in June 2002 after being handed a 15 year prison sentence.

Combined with a leader and regime that have long dominated the political scene, Djibouti could otherwise be seen as an unlikely candidate for a coup attempt. However, last April's presidential election--"won" by Guellah with 97%+ of a vote boycotted by the opposition--had seen the country jump to the top of CoupCast's list of likeliest places to see a coup. These predictions, which can vary substantially month-to-month, subsided following Guellah's victory, but might still have hinted that the potential for a coup was greater than what casual observers might have thought.

It remains unclear, however, what has actually transpired. Though the arrests could very well reflect a developing conspiracy, the recent coup epidemic in the region could just as easily help justify the elimination of anyone who could feasibly act as a threat to the incumbent.

Further reading on coup-related arrests and purges:
Jun Koga Sudduth. Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships. Comparative Political Studies.
Curtis Bell. Coup d'etat and Democracy. Comparative Political Studies.
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Conspiracy in the Congo?

2/14/2022

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With all the attention given to the recent successful coups and violent coup effort seen in Guinea-Bissau, recent developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo are flying a bit under the radar. Signs of trouble first emerged when President Felix Tshisekedi abruptly departed the African Union summit in Addis Ababa. While exits may sometimes occur, Tshisekedi's departure was notable in that he was the current AU chairman. 

News soon spread that his exit  was connected to one of the very emphases of the AU meeting: coups d'etat. Presidential security adviser Francois Beya and an undisclosed number of military officers have reportedly been detained by the National Intelligence Agency. On Saturday, thousands of Republican Guard soldiers parolled Kinshasa, an overt display of stregnth by Tshisekedi.

Though details on the alleged plot are scarce, Beya's arrest could act as the latest move from the Tshisekedi regime to further reduce the influence of former president Joseph Kabila. Beya - nicknamed Mr. Security and widely seen as Congo's "intelligence strongman" has - been an important figure in the country's security and intelligence apparatus. Earning his stripes in Mobutu's National Security Council, Beya has served under every DRC president. 

More recently, he has been seen as the most prominent Kabila loyalist in the regime. His arrest could act as another move toward consolidating Tshisekedi's position, a campaign that overtly commenced in December 2020 when Tshisekedi demolished the power sharing arrangement he had crafted with the outgoing president. After gaining control of the parliament after threatening to dissolve it, prominent political veterans found themselves being targeted.

Jeanine Mobumba, speaker of the lower house, was removed in an impeachment vote. February 2021 saw the removal of long-time political heavyweight Alexis Thambwe Mwamba pushed from the Senate, while Prime Minister Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba was replaced. Kabiila's brother Zoe was removed from his own post as governor of Tanganyika province. In the last week, Zoe Kabila has also been barred from traveling from the DRC while also facing questioning by the intelligence services. More recently, Kabila ally Albert Yuma has been replaced as the chairman of Gecamines, the country's state-controlled copper and cobalt mining company. In addition, Jean-Marc Kabund's more recent resignation from the parliament suggests potential rifts within Tshisekedi's own camp.

The arrests of prominent figures - such as Beya-  might very well signal the unraveling of coup conspiracies. However, such efforts are also a commonly-used tool for consolidating power in the absence of an actual plot.

​JP
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, COUPS, AND ELECTORAL ‘ATTABOYS

2/10/2022

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The following was recently published at Political Violence at a Glance.​

Jonathan Powell & Salah Ben Hammou

Coups in Africa have reached crisis proportions. Since Niger’s failed March 2021 coup, coup attempts have progressed at a rate rivaled only by the continent’s original coup epidemic in the mid-1960s. Just last week, soldiers attempted but ultimately failed to take power in Guinea-Bissau. While West Africa—and more specifically, the Sahel—receives the most attention, coups are happening across the continent, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

Although coups are by nature domestic affairs, the international community plays a key role in the politics that drive them. Would-be coup plotters closely consider the potential responses of foreign actors, and observe and learn from recent precedent. A meek international response to coups could embolden would-be coupists to take power and vice versa.

Following this logic, it appears that coupists are learning to circumvent the international community’s typical demand in post-coup situations—that elections be held—to entrench themselves in power.

To be clear, the international community is rarely able to “reverse” a coup—i.e., reinstate the ousted leader. Of the dozens of successful coups in Africa since 1950, only a few have seen this outcome. For instance, French paratroopers reinstated President Léon M’ba in 1964 in Gabon. Peacekeeping forces under the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group successfully reinstated Sierra Leone’s Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to the presidency in February 1998. South Africa upended Lesotho’s post-coup government with a unilateral intervention in 1998. São Tomé and Príncipe saw its 2003 coup leaders quickly retreat following international backlash, including the specter of a Nigerian military intervention. These kinds of interventions are usually only possible in small and militarily weak states. In fact, efforts to reinstate leaders have virtually vanished despite the fact that various leaders have ostensibly embraced an anti-coup norm, and organizations such as the African Union (AU) are heralded for curbing the practice. In the case of the AU, it would be difficult to claim a single case of success. Simply put, when leaders are removed, they “stay gone.”

Rather than seek the return of ousted leaders, international and regional actors have instead emphasized a “return to constitutional order.” For instance, following the death of Chadian President Idriss Déby in April 2021, the military assumed power and abolished the constitution, which called for the Speaker of Parliament to take power in the event of the president’s death. Several countries, including France, urged the coupists to initiate a political transition—which would require the post-coup junta to hold or allow elections—rather than designate power back to parliament. (The junta has stated its intention to tentatively hold elections within 18 months.)

Post-coup elections once meant that coupists would hand power back to civilians and depart from politics, particularly after the AU’s formation in 2002. For instance, among eleven different coups across the continent between 2003 and 2012, only two (Togo 2005, Mauritania 2008) saw a coupist retain power via election.

More recently, however, that trend has reversed. Military coups in Egypt (2013) and Zimbabwe (2017) saw coup leaders or their close associates retain power via elections. The only potential recent exception is Burkina Faso, where, following Blaise Compaoré’s 2014 ouster, elements of the armed forces took power and ushered the country toward democratic elections that were not contested by coupists.

Another pattern is at work, however. Though coups in Mauritania (2005), Egypt (2011), Mali (2012), and Burkina Faso (2014) were followed by elections free from coupist participation, these cases saw the armed forces re-intervene against the electoral victors. For instance, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, the victor of the 2012 post-coup elections, was deposed in 2013 by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who went on to win the presidency in the 2014 election with little pushback from the international community. Mauritania’s 2008 coupist, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, would go on to win the presidency in the country’s 2009 and 2014 elections but did not seek reelection in 2019. In a highly contentious case accompanied by substantial international pressure, Madagascar (2009) saw a coupist, Andry Rajoelina, reluctantly step away from contesting the election. He did, however, return to win the presidency via the next election in 2018.

What do these developments suggest? Despite the international community’s view that elections might drive coupists from politics, the armed forces and their associates are in fact entrenching themselves in power, either directly through the use of elections or in spite of them. This trend coincides with the rise of democratic backsliding and executive aggrandizement, in which incumbents use democratic institutions such as popular mandates or elections to erode checks against their political power. Paradoxically, coup leaders have increasingly cited executive aggrandizement as a key reason for their intervention into politics. For instance, Guinea’s September 2021 coup saw Colonel Mamady Doumbouya topple President Alpha Condé, citing the president’s “non-respect of democratic principles.” For context, despite the constitution’s two-term limit, Condé had won reelection for a third term in 2020, sparking mass unrest and leading to allegations of electoral fraud and democratic erosion. The question now becomes whether Guinea’s armed forces will use the country’s elections--which have still not been announced—to similarly entrench themselves or if the junta will make good on its promise to bar its members from running as candidates.

Ultimately, efforts to preserve or initiate democracy in post-coup states will require the international community to move beyond the simple demand that elections be held. Rather than issuing a yellow card that tells coupists such as Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to tread carefully while remaining on the pitch, the international community must unequivocally demonstrate that coupists face lifetime bans from holding power.

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    Welcome to the Arrested Dictatorship blog. Posts on recent events are periodically updated as more information becomes available. It is currently edited by Jonathan Powell and Salah Ben Hammou at the University of Central Florida.
    Monthly Reviews
    November Review
    October Review

    September Review​
    Commentary
    Civilian Participation in Military Rule.
    Salah Ben Hammou.​
    Reflecting on Revolution, Counter-Revolution in Sudan.
    Salah Ben Hammou.
    Don't Forget the Coup Plots! Salah Ben Hammou.
    Coup allegations in Djibouti. J Powell.
    Conspiracy in the Congo? J Powell.
    The Int. Community, Coups, and Electoral 'Attaboys. J Powell & Salah Ben Hammou.
    Decolonizing Coup Data, Salah Ben Hammou.
    Coups and Democracy, J Powell & Mwita Chacha.
    Coups & Clickbait, J Powell.
    Iraq 1936, Salah Ben Hammou.
    Failed Coup...Successful Transition? Salah Ben Hammou & J Powell

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